Onesuchprinciplewasgiveninchap。i。§；3
ofthisBook；whereIpointedoutthatwhateveractionanyofusjudgestoberightforhimself，heimplicitlyjudgestoberightforallsimilarpersonsinsimilarcircumstances。Or，aswemayotherwiseputit，`ifakindofconductthatisright(orwrong)formeisnotright(orwrong)
forsomeoneelse，itmustbeonthegroundofsomedifferencebetweenthetwocases，otherthanthefactthatIandhearedifferentpersons。’
Acorrespondingpropositionmaybestatedwithequaltruthinrespectofwhatoughttobedoneto——notby——differentindividuals。
Theseprincipleshavebeenmostwidelyrecognised，notintheirmostabstractanduniversalform，butintheirspecialapplicationtothesituationoftwo(ormore)individualssimilarlyrelatedtoeachother:assoapplied，theyappearinwhatispopularlyknownastheGoldenRule，`Dotoothersasyouwouldhavethemdotoyou。’Thisformulaisobviouslyunpreciseinstatement；foronemightwishforanother’sco-operationinsin，andbewillingtoreciprocateit。Norisiteventruetosaythatweoughttodotoothersonlywhatwethinkitrightforthemtodotous；fornoonewilldenythattheremaybedifferencesinthecircumstances——andeveninthenatures——oftwoindividuals，AandB，whichwouldmakeitwrongforAtotreatBinthewayinwhichitisrightforBtotreatA。
Inshorttheself-evidentprinciplestrictlystatedmusttakesomesuchnegativeformasthis；`itcannotberightforAtotreatBinamannerinwhichitwouldbewrongforBtotreatA，merelyonthegroundthattheyaretwodifferentindividuals，andwithouttherebeinganydifferencebetweenthenaturesorcircumstancesofthetwowhichcanbestatedasareasonablegroundfordifferenceoftreatment。’Suchaprinciplemanifestlydoesnotgivecompleteguidance——indeeditseffect，strictlyspeaking，ismerelytothrowadefiniteonusprobandionthemanwhoappliestoanotheratreatmentofwhichhe，wouldcomplainifappliedtohimself；
butCommonSensehasamplyrecognisedthepracticalimportanceofthemaxim:
anditstruth，sofarasitgoes，appearstomeself-evident。
AsomewhatdifferentapplicationofthesamefundamentalprinciplethatindividualsinsimilarconditionsshouldbetreatedsimilarlyfindsitssphereintheordinaryadministrationofLaw，or(aswesay)
of`Justice’。Accordinglyin§；1ofchap。v。ofthisBookIdrewattentionto`impartialityintheapplicationofgeneralrules’，asanimportantelementinthecommonnotionofJustice；indeed，thereultimatelyappearedtobenootherelementwhichcouldbeintuitivelyknownwithperfectclearnessandcertainty。Hereagainitmustbeplainthatthispreceptofimpartialityisinsufficientforthecompletedeterminationofjustconduct，asitdoesnothelpustodecidewhatkindofrulesshouldbethusimpartiallyapplied；
thoughalladmittheimportanceofexcludingfromgovernment，andhumanconductgenerally，allconsciouspartialityand`respectofpersons’。
Theprinciplejustdiscussed，whichseemstobemoreorlessclearlyimpliedinthecommonnotionof`fairness’or`equity’，isobtainedbyconsideringthesimilarityoftheindividualsthatmakeupaLogicalWholeorGenus。Thereareothers，nolessimportant，whichemergeintheconsiderationofthesimilarpartsofaMathematicalorQuantitativeWhole。SuchaWholeispresentedinthecommonnotionoftheGood——or，asissometimessaid，`goodonthewhole’——ofanyindividualhumanbeing。Theproposition`thatoneoughttoaimatone’sowngood’issometimesgivenasthemaximofRationalSelf-loveorPrudence:
butassostateditdoesnotclearlyavoidtautology；sincewemaydefine`good’as`whatoneoughttoaimat’。If，however，wesay’one’sgoodonthewhole’，theadditionsuggestsaprinciplewhich，whenexplicitlystated，is，atanyrate，nottautological。Ihavealreadyreferredtothisprincipleasthat`ofimpartialconcernforallpartsofourconsciouslife’:——wemightexpressitconciselybysaying`thatHereafterassuchistoberegardedneitherlessnormorethanNow’。Itisnot，ofcourse，meantthatthegoodofthepresentmaynotreasonablybepreferredtothatofthefutureonaccountofitsgreatercertainty:oragain，thataweektenyearshencemaynotbemoreimportanttousthanaweeknow，throughanincreaseinourmeansorcapacitiesofhappiness。Allthattheprincipleaffirmsisthatthemeredifferenceofpriorityandposteriorityintimeisnotareasonablegroundforhavingmoreregardtotheconsciousnessofonemomentthattothatofanother。Theforminwhichitpracticallypresentsitselftomostmenis`thatasmallerpresentgoodisnottobepreferredtoagreaterfuturegood’(allowingfordifferenceofcertainty):
sincePrudenceisgenerallyexercisedinrestrainingapresentdesire(theobjectorsatisfactionofwhichwecommonlyregardasprotanto`agood’)，onaccountoftheremoterconsequencesofgratifyingit。Thecommonestviewoftheprinciplewouldnodoubtbethatthepresentpleasureorhappinessisreasonablytobeforegonewiththeviewofobtaininggreaterpleasureorhappinesshereafter:buttheprincipleneednotberestrictedtoahedonisticapplication；itisequallyapplicabletoanyotherinterpretationof`one’sowngood，’inwhichgoodisconceivedasamathematicalwhole，ofwhichtheintegrantpartsarerealisedindifferentpartsormomentsofalifetime。Andthereforeitisperhapsbettertodistinguishitherefromtheprinciple`thatPleasureisthesoleUltimateGood’，whichdoesnotseemtohaveanylogicalconnexionwithit。
Sofarwehaveonlybeenconsideringthe`GoodontheWhole’ofasingleindividual:butjustasthisnotionisconstructedbycomparisonandintegrationofthedifferent`goods’thatsucceedoneanotherintheseriesofourconsciousstates，sowehaveformedthenotionofUniversalGoodbycomparisonandintegrationofthegoodsofallindividualhuman——orsentient——existences。Andhereagain，justasintheformerme，byconsideringtherelationoftheintegrantpartstothewholeandtoeachother，Iobtaintheself-evidentprinciplethatthegoodofanyoneindividualisofnomoreimportance，fromthepointofview(ifImaysayso)oftheUniverse，thanthegoodofanyother；unless，thatis，therearespecialgroundsforbelievingthatmoregoodislikelytoberealisedintheonecasethanintheother。AnditisevidenttomethatasarationalbeingIamboundtoaimatgoodgenerally，——sofarasitisattainablebymyefforts，——notmerelyataparticularpartofit。
Fromthesetworationalintuitionswemaydeduce，asanecessaryinference，themaximofBenevolenceinanabstractform:
viz。thateachoneismorallyboundtoregardthegoodofanyotherindividualasmuchashisown，exceptinsofarashejudgesittobeless，whenimpartiallyviewed，orlesscertainlyknowableorattainablebyhim。IbeforeobservedthatthedutyofBenevolenceasrecognisedbycommonsenseseemstofallsomewhatshortofthis。ButIthinkitmaybefairlyurgedinexplanationofthisthatpracticallyeachman，evenwithaviewtouniversalGood，oughtchieflytoconcernhimselfwithpromotingthegoodofalimitednumberofhumanbeings，andthatgenerallyinproportiontotheclosenessoftheirconnexionwithhim。Ithinkthata`plainman’，inamoderncivilisedsociety，ifhisconsciencewerefairlybroughttoconsiderthehypotheticalquestion，whetheritwouldbemorallyrightforhimtoseekhisownhappinessonanyoccasionifitinvolvedacertainsacrificeofthegreaterhappinessofsomeotherhumanbeing，——withoutanycounterbalancinggaintoanyoneelse，——wouldanswerunhesitatinglyinthenegative。
IhavetriedtoshowhowintheprinciplesofJustice，Prudence，andRationalBenevolenceascommonlyrecognisedthereisatleastaself-evidentelement，immediatelycognisablebyabstractintuition；dependingineachcaseontherelationwhichindividualsandtheirparticularendsbearaspartstotheirwholes，andtootherpartsofthesewholes。Iregardtheapprehension，withmoreorlessdistinctness，oftheseabstracttruths，asthepermanentbasisofthecommonconvictionthatthefundamentalpreceptsofmoralityareessentiallyreasonable。Nodoubttheseprinciplesareoftenplacedsidebysidewithotherpreceptstowhichcustomandgeneralconsenthavegivenamerelyillusoryairofself-evidence:butthedistinctionbetweenthetwokindsofmaximsappearstometobecomemanifestbymerelyreflectinguponthem。Iknowbydirectreflectionthatthepropositions，`Ioughttospeakthetruth’，`Ioughttokeepmypromises’——howevertruetheymaybe——arenotself-evidenttome；theypresentthemselvesaspropositionsrequiringrationaljustificationofsomekind。Ontheotherhand，thepropositions，`Ioughtnottopreferapresentlessergoodtoafuturegreatergood’，and`Ioughtnottoprefermyownlessergoodtothegreatergoodofanother’，[2]dopresentthemselvesasself-evident；asmuch(e。g。)asthemathematicalaxiomthat`ifequalsbeaddedtoequalsthewholesareequal。’
Itisonaccountofthefundamentalandmanifestimportance，inmyview，ofthedistinctionabovedrawnbetween(1)themoralmaximswhichreflectionshowsnottopossessultimatevalidity，and(2)themoralmaximswhichareorinvolvegenuineethicalaxioms，thatIrefrainedattheoutsetofthisinvestigationfromenteringatlengthintothepsychogonicalquestionastotheoriginofapparentmoralintuitions。
FornopsychogonicaltheoryhaseverbeenputforwardprofessingtodiscreditthepropositionsthatIregardasreallyaxiomatic，byshowingthatthecauseswhichproducedthemweresuchashadatendencytomakethemfalse:
whileasregardstheformerclassofmaxims，apsychogonicalproofthattheyareuntrustworthywhentakenasabsolutelyandwithoutqualificationtrueisinmyview，superfluous:sincedirectreflectionshowsmetheyhavenoclaimtobesotaken。Ontheotherhand，sofaraspsychogonicaltheoryrepresentsmoralrulesas，speakingbroadlyandgenerally，meanstotheendsofindividualandsocialgoodorwell-being，itobviouslytendstogiveageneralsupporttotheconclusionstowhichtheprecedingdiscussionhasbroughtusbyadifferentmethod:sinceitleadsustoregardothermoralrulesassubordinatetotheprinciplesofPrudenceandBenevolence。[3]
1should，however，relylessconfidentlyontheconclusionssetforthintheprecedingsection，iftheydidnotappeartometobeinsubstantialagreement——inspiteofsuperficialdifferences——withthedoctrinesofthosemoralistswhohavebeenmostinearnestinseekingamongcommonlyreceivedmoralrulesforgenuineintuitionsofthePracticalReason。I
havealreadypointedoutthatinthehistoryofEnglishEthicstheearlierintuitionalschoolshow，inthisrespect，aturnofthoughtonthewholemorephilosophicalthanthatwhichthereactionagainstHumerenderedprevalent。
Amongthewritersofthisschoolthereisnoonewhoshowsmoreearnestnessintheefforttopenetratetoreallyself-evidentprinciplesthanClarke。
Accordingly，IfindthatClarkelaysdown，inrespectofourbehaviourtowardsourfellow-men，twofundamental``rulesofrighteousness’’:thefirstofwhichhetermsEquity，andthesecondLoveorBenevolence。TheRuleofEquityhestatesthus:``WhateverIjudgereasonableorunreasonablethatanothershoulddoforme:thatbythesamejudgmentIdeclarereasonableorunreasonablethatIshouldinthelikecasedoforhim’’[4]——whichisofcourse，the`GoldenRule’preciselystated。Theobligationto``UniversalLoveorBenevolence’’heexhibitsasfollows:——
``IftherebeanaturalandnecessarydifferencebetweenGoodandEvil:andthatwhichisGoodisfitandreasonable，andthatwhichisEvilisunreasonable，tobedone:
aridthatwhichistheGreatestGoodisalwaysthemostfitandreasonabletobechosen:then？everyrationalcreatureoughtinitssphereandstation，accordingtoitsrespectivepowersandfaculties，todoalltheGooditcantoitsfellow-creatures:towhichend，universalLoveandBenevolenceisplainlythemostcertain，direct，andeffectualmeans。’’[5；
Herethemerestatementthatarationalagentisboundtoaimatuniversalgoodisopentothechargeoftautology，sinceClarkedefines`Good’as`thatwhichisfitandreasonabletobedone’。
ButClarkeobviouslyholdsthateachindividual`rationalcreature’iscapableofreceivinggoodinagreaterorlessdegree，suchgoodbeinganintegrantpartofuniversalgood。Thisindeedisimpliedinthecommonnotion，whichheuses，of`doingGoodtoone’sfellow-creatures’，or，asheotherwiseexpressesit，`promotingtheirwelfareandhappiness。’Andthushisprincipleisimplicitlywhatwasstatedabove，thatthegoodorwelfareofanyoneindividualmustassuchbeanobjectofrationalaimtoanyotherreasonableindividualnolessthanhisownsimilargoodorwelfare。
(Itshouldbeobserved，however，thatthepropositionthatUniversalBenevolenceistherightmeanstotheattainmentofuniversalgood，isnotquiteself-evident；sincetheendmaynotalwaysbebestattainedbydirectlyaimingatit。ThusRationalBenevolence，likeRationalSelf-Love，maybeself-limiting；maydirectitsownpartialsuppressioninfavourofotherimpulses。)
